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Abstract
While the social cost of carbon (SCC) has played a prominent role in regulatory decision-making in recent years, use in
the environmental impact assessment (EIA) realm has been minimal. This article explores potential roles for SCC in
EIA. Using Canada’s proposed new federal impact assessment (IA) regime as a basis, the analysis examines how a
jurisdiction could employ SCC to integrate climate change considerations into project-level assessment and decisionmaking. Potential roles are first discussed in relation to the broad purposes of IA, before focusing on key assessment
factors such as consideration of economic costs and benefits, cumulative effects, climate change commitments and
sustainability. Notwithstanding important SCC critiques and limitations, this article identifies several ways in which
SCC could be incorporated into IA, finding a particularly strong fit where an assessment deals with a project’s
economic costs and benefits. Additionally, as a metric that links project emissions to climate change damages, as
opposed to project impacts on emission reduction targets, SCC could be used to complement more traditional carbon
emission calculations. This article is the first to provide detailed consideration of the potential roles of SCC in IA in
Canada. The analysis has broad international relevance as jurisdictions work to put in place policies and tools including carbon pricing mechanisms - to achieve commitments under the Paris Agreement.

INTRODUCTION
Avoiding dangerous climate change requires significant greenhouse gas emission reductions driven
by a mix of tools. 1 One such tool is environmental impact assessment (EIA). 2 Recently, calls for
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1 See Rajendra K. Pachauri and Leo A. Meyer eds., Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and
III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014)
at 79-86, online: <https://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_SynthesisReport.pdf> [IPCC AR5]. See also Valeria
Masson-Delmotte et al., Summary for Policymakers in: Global warming of 1.5°C An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat
of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, (Geneva, Switzerland: World Meteorological Organization,
2018), online: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2018/07/SR15_SPM_High_Res.pdf [IPCC 1.5° SPM]. See
also, Benjamin J. DeAngelo, et al. eds. Reducing Risks Through Emissions Mitigation. In Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United
States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II, (Washington, DC: U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2018) at 1346–
1386, online: <https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/29/>
2 EIA is one of several ways to characterize assessment of environmental and other impacts. Other common articulations are
“environmental assessment”, “impact assessment” and “Environmental Impact Statement”. Given the proposed changes at
the federal level in Canada, we use “Impact Assessment” (IA) throughout, unless referring to the specific report typically
generated through EIA and IA, which is referred to herein as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). See Bram Noble,
Introduction to Environmental Impact Assessment: A Guide to Principles and Practice, 3rd ed (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2015) at
2 (explaining terms being used interchangeably) [Noble, Intro to EIA].
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integration of climate change considerations into EIA have been intensifying. In Canada, changes to
the federal EIA regime are now imminent, with climate change considerations figuring prominently
in the draft “impact assessment” (IA) legislation. 3
Integrating climate change considerations into IA is not a straightforward exercise. 4 To make
analysis of climate change considerations a meaningful part of IA, governments must choose from a
range of approaches and frameworks such as carbon budgeting and decarbonization pathways. 5
Such approaches are means of contextualizing the climate change considerations in a way that can
assist in fulfilling the traditional EIA purposes of informed decision-making and planning.
This article explores whether the social cost of carbon (SCC) may have a roles to play as a tool to
integrate climate change considerations into IA. SCC is a dollar figure representing the estimated
value of damages avoided per unit of carbon emissions reductions. 6 It provides an economic
valuation of the impacts of climate change. 7 For example, SCC could be deployed to contribute to
understanding of the merits and drawbacks of proposed projects, particularly in relation to
economic dimensions and international climate change commitments. Using SCC as a way to
understand climate considerations in IA could improve consistency and coherence between projectlevel decisions, national emission reduction targets and international commitments. It may
contribute to understanding how project-level decisions relate to the overarching international
objective to mitigate the worst effects of climate change, as agreed to in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
This paper is the first to provide detailed consideration of the potential roles of SCC in IA in
Canada. Our primary inquiry asks whether SCC holds promise as a part of IA, and how it could be
most effectively used. Part I introduces impact assessment, including the goals, components, and
evolution of the tool. Part II introduces SCC, explaining what it is, how it has been used to date, and
3 Bill C-69, An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act, and
to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018 (third reading 20 June 2018) [Bill C-69].
4 See Robert Gibson et al., “The Paris to Projects Research Initiative: Discussion Paper” (February 2018), online:
https://uwaterloo.ca/paris-to-projects/sites/ca.paris-to-projects/files/uploads/files/p2p_cc_in_asmt_law.pdf [Gibson et al.
“Paris to Projects Discussion Paper”]. See also Environment and Climate Change Canada, Discussion Paper: Developing a strategic
assessment of climate change (September 2018) [ECCC, “Discussion Paper”]. See also Meinhard Doelle, “Integrating Climate
Change into Environmental Impact Assessments: Key Design Elements”, October 2018, online:
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3273499>
5 Gibson et al., “Form Paris to Projects: Clarifying the implications of Canada’s climate change mitigation commitments for the
planning and assessment of projects and strategic undertakings”, Summary Report, January 2019, at 11-18; online:
<https://uwaterloo.ca/paris-to-projects/sites/ca.paris-to-projects/files/uploads/files/p2p_summary_report_23jan19.pdf>
[Gibson et al, “Paris to Projects Summary Report]”. See also Gibson, Paris to Projects Discussion Paper supra note 4. See also
Andrew Gage, A Carbon Budget for Canada: A collaborative framework for federal and provincial climate leadership (Vancouver: WCEL,
December 2015), at iii, online:
https://www.wcel.org/sites/default/files/publications/CarbonBudget%20(Web)_0.pdf
6 See William Pizer et al, “Using and improving the social cost of carbon: (2014) 346:6214 Science 1189; Richard Revesz et al,
“Improve Economic Models of Climate Change” (2014) 508:7495 Nature 173; Arden Rowell, “Foreign Impacts and Climate
Change” (2015) 39 Harv Envtl L Rev 371; William Nordhaus, “Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon: Background and
Results from the Rice-2011 Model” (2011) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17540, online: <
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17540>. See also Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Technical Update to ECCC’s
Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas Estimates” (March 2016) at 1, [ECCC, “Technical Update”].
7 See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Valuing Climate Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost
of Carbon Dioxide, (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2017) [NAS, Valuing Climate Damages].
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several critiques and limitations. Part III goes on to discuss what roles SCC could have in integrating
climate change considerations into IA. These potential roles are discussed in relation to the purposes
of IA, the assessment and decision-making phases of IA, strategic assessment, and associated
limitations and challenges. The paper concludes with final reflections and starting points for further
research.
While a small amount of literature and litigation has surfaced in the United States, 8 to date there has
been no similar work in the Canadian context. This paper is particularly timely given the
comprehensive reform of the Canadian IA regime that is currently underway. Bill C-69, 9 which
contains the proposed new Canadian Impact Assessment Act, passed third reading in the House of
Commons in June 2018; it includes the first ever explicit requirement to factor climate change
considerations into IA in Canada. More broadly, this paper has relevance internationally as countries
work to put in place policies and tools - including carbon pricing mechanisms - to achieve targets
under the Paris Agreement. Analysis in this paper may also contribute to reconciling unexplained
differences between SCC values and different emerging carbon price benchmarks, 10 and to
improving shortcomings in SCC practices in Canada and the U.S. 11

PART I - INTRODUCING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Impact assessment plays a unique role in the overall effort to manage the impact of human activities
in the natural world. Whereas most environmental protection tools seek to regulate the
environmental impacts of existing, ongoing human activities, IA seeks to predict the impact of
proposed activities before they are allowed to proceed. The primary goal of IAs is to inform
decisions on whether and under what conditions to approve proposed new activities. 12
IA processes vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some are broader in scope, some apply to a
broader range of proposed activities, and some offer a greater range of process options to suit a
range of different types of proposed activities. However, the basic elements of most IA processes
are remarkably similar. IA processes tend to be triggered by a combination of a list of activities to
be assessed (or not to be assessed) and some discretion to deviate from the list. 13 Planning of the IA
process tends to involve a review of the proposed activity to see whether or how thoroughly it needs
to be assessed, a decision on what process is most suitable for the assessment, and determinations
See e.g. Anthony Radauzo, “The CO2 Monetization Gap: Integrating the Social Cost of Carbon into NEPA”, (2018) Colum L
Rev, Vol. 118, No.2.
9 Supra note 3.
10 David V Wright, “Dissonance in Federal Carbon Pricing Regime(s)” (26 January 2018), ABlawg (blog), online:
<https://ablawg.ca/2018/01/26/dissonance-in-federal-carbon-pricing-regimes/>.
11 See David Wright, “Carbonated Fodder: The Social Cost of Carbon in Canadian and US Regulatory Decision-Making”
(2017) 29 Georgetown Environmental L Rev 513 [Wright, “Carbonated Fodder”]
12 See e.g. Government of Canada, “Basics of Environmental Assessment” (18 July 2018), online:
<https://www.canada.ca/en/environmental-assessment-agency/services/environmental-assessments/basics-environmentalassessment.html#gen01> for more information on environmental assessments in Canada.
13 Of course, there are other triggers, such as the so called ‘law list’ trigger under the original Canadian Environmental
Assessment (CEAA). See Meinhard Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process: A Guide and Critique (Markham,
Ontario: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008).
8
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on the scope of the activity to be assessed and the scope of the issues to be considered in the
assessment.
The planning phase of an IA process is usually followed by the preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) either by or on behalf of the proponent. The EIS is then reviewed by
government officials and intervenors, resulting in a consideration of the issues or concerns
associated with the proposed activity, ultimately resulting in a decision as to whether, and under
what conditions the proposed activity should or can be approved. Most IA processes include some
form of follow-up, often designed narrowly to ensure compliance with terms and conditions rather
than more broadly to ensure appropriate adaptation of the approved project in case impacts were
underestimated or to ensure learning for the benefit of relevant future IAs. 14
When IA was first introduced in the 1970s and 1980s, 15 the focus was largely on biophysical impacts
of proposed activities, and on identifying economically viable mitigation measures to reduce these
impacts as much as practically possible. Only in rare cases of predicted large scale environmental
effects that could not be mitigated were assessed activities not approved at all. 16 Over time, IA has
become more ambitious in its objectives, to considering whether the proposed activity contributes
to sustainability and whether it is the preferred way to meet the stated need, purpose and rational of
a proposed activity.
This evolution of IA has, of course, not been linear, with significant instances of retreat. 17 A notable
example was the repeal and replacement of Canada’s federal assessment legislation in 2012, which
significantly weakened the regime and narrowed its application. 18 Notwithstanding uneven practice
and implementation, key elements have evolved over the past 40 years, including the following:
•
•
•
•

A transition from a focus on biophysical impacts to a broader range of impacts, benefits, risks
and uncertainties associated with a proposal.
A transition from assessing the proposal in isolation to assessing it in the context of a range of
alternatives.
A shift from a focus on project assessments to the integration of strategic and regional
assessments, creating a tiered overall assessment and decision-making process. 19
An increased role for the public as an important source of information and as an active and
interested participant in the process of determining whether a proposed activity is a good way to
meet the states need, purpose and rational.

See e.g. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 53(4).
See Noble, Intro to EIA supra note 2 at 7.
16 See e.g. Kemess North Copper-Gold Mine Project, Joint Review Panel Summary Report (September 17, 2007), online:
https://www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents/23469/23469E.pdf
17 See Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA As We Know It?” (2012) 24 J Envtl L & Prac 1. See also,
Robert B Gibson, “In Full Retreat: The Canadian Government’s New Environmental Assessment Law Undoes Decades of
Progress” (2012) 30:3 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 179.
18 Ibid.
19 See John Sinclair, Meinhard Doelle & Peter Duinker, “Looking Up, Down, and Sideways: Reconceiving Cumulative Effects
Assessment as a Mindset” (2017) 62 Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 183 (For a more detailed discussion of the respective
roles of regional, strategic and project level assessments in an integrated IA process that effectively deals with cumulative
effects).
14
15
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•

A shift toward more cooperation among affected jurisdictions, including indigenous
governments, in carrying out IA processes.

Efforts to improve IA have resulted in recent years in discussions both in the literature and in the
context of law reform efforts in Canada about the concept of next generation IA. Next generation
IA is based on the idea that for IA to become an effective tool for sustainability, what is needed is a
more comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing the multiple shortcomings of the IA
experience to date. Only an integrated approach, it is suggested, will take IA from its current state
toward a truly effective tool for sustainability-based decision making, with the goal of ensuring new
activities actually make a net contribution to the elusive goal of sustainability. 20
Among the key elements of a transition to next generation IA is the consideration of need, purpose
and rationale from a societal rather than proponent’s perspective, the consideration of a range of
promising alternatives to the proposed activity, the integration of regional, strategic and project level
assessments, particularly with respect to future development scenarios and cumulative effects,
implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) 21, the design of engagement processes to maximize mutual learning opportunities for
proponents, government officials, Indigenous peoples and interested members of the public, and
better direction to decision makers on how to ensure approved projects will contribute to
sustainability. 22 These elements are thought to be interdependent if IA is to become a truly effective
decision making tool. 23
The federal IA process in Canada has gone through a number of significant transitions since its
introduction in the 1970s. It first became legally binding in the 1980s in the form of the
Environmental Assessment Review Process (EARP) Guidelines Order. It was first legislated in
1992 in the form of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA). 24 It was then
fundamentally changed in 2012, 25 and is currently going through another significant reform. 26 The
end product of the most recent effort, a new federal Impact Assessment Act (IAA), 27 has made
considerable strides in seeking to implement core elements of next generation IA. In particular, the
IAA broadens the scope of the federal assessment to include all environmental, social, economic and
health impacts and benefits of proposed activities and to make project decisions based on a
proposed activities’ contribution to sustainability. It seeks to bring regional and strategic
assessments into the overall assessment process. It encourages cooperative approaches with
See Robert Gibson, Meinhard Doelle & John Sinclair, “Fulfilling the Promise: Basic Components of Next Generation
Environmental Assessment” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 257 [Gibson et al., “Fulfilling the Promise”].
21 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), GA Res, UNGA, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES?61/295
(2007).
22 See generally Gibson et al., “Fulfilling the Promise” supra note 20 (detailing elements of “next generation” IA).
23 See Gibson et al, “Fulfilling the Promise” supra note 19.
24 See Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37
25 See Doelle, supra note 16.
26 Meinhard Doelle & John Sinclair, “Post-Assessment Approval (Follow-Up) Processes under the Proposed Federal Impact
Assessment Act (IAA)” (18 March 2018), Marine and Environmental Law News (blog), online: <
https://blogs.dal.ca/melaw/2018/03/18/post-assessment-approval-follow-up-processes-under-the-proposed-federal-impactassessment-act-iaa/>.
27 Supra note 3. Royal Assent is expected in spring 2019 with proclamation expected to follow in late 2019.
20
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interested provincial and indigenous jurisdictions and it seeks to implement the process in a manner
more consistent with Canada’s obligations to its Indigenous population, including UNDRIP.
Notably, particularly in relation to SCC, the IAA specifically includes positive and negative
consequences of a project on “economic conditions” as a factor to be considered. 28 Finally, and of
primary relevance for purposes of this article, the IAA specifically requires that every assessment and
final decision under the Act considers the impact of a proposed project on Canada’s climate
commitments. 29
A project assessment under the IAA is triggered by way of a designated project list to be developed
by regulations, in combination with discretion to assess projects not listed 30 and to not require an
assessment of a designated project. 31 The first phase of an assessment under the IAA consists of
early planning. The basic concept is to encourage proponents to initiate the assessment early with
an initial project description on the basis of which government officials at federal and other levels of
government as well as interested members of the public can engage in discussions about the
appropriate scope of the assessment, opportunities for a cooperative assessment with other
jurisdictions, selection of an appropriate assessment process, appropriate forms of public
engagement and information requirements for the assessment phase. The IAA is clear that subject
to decisions about the relevance and focus for a particular project, the scope of the assessment
includes the full range of impacts and benefits of a proposed project. The early planning phase then
concludes with direction to the proponent on the information it needs to gather for the assessment
phase, along with a decision on whether to proceed by way of a standard assessment run by the
responsible federal Impact Assessment Agency, or by way of an independent Review Panel.
The planning phase is followed by the information gathering phase, where proponents and others
(such as federal departments, other jurisdictions and intervenors) take time to gather the information
needed for the assessment phase. The assessment is then triggered by the proponent’s filing of the
required information and is carried out either by the Agency or by a Review Panel. The results of
the assessment are shared with federal decision makers to make two key determinations. First, a
determination is made about the project’s impact on areas of federal responsibilities. Assuming
there are sufficient impacts on areas of federal jurisdiction to warrant federal involvement in the
project decision, the decision making then turns to the broader question whether the project is in
the public interest in light of the information gathered. 32 There are a number of elements to the
public interest determination, but key among them for the purposes of this article are the project’s
contribution to sustainability, and the question whether the project will contribute to or hinder
Canada’s efforts to meet its climate commitments and environmental obligations. Beyond the
assessment and decision-making phases, the IAA requires a follow-up program for each project,
Bill C-69, supra note 3 s.22(1)(a)
Bill C-69, supra note 3 s.22(1)(i); s.63(e).
30
Bill C-69, supra note 3 s.9(1) (Ministerial power to designate a project not on the designated project list).
31 Bill C-69, supra note 3 s.16(1) (Agency authority to decided whether an impact assessment of the designated project is
required).
32 Bill C-69, supra note 3 s.60(1)(a). It should be noted, however, that federal jurisdiction in IA is subject to constitutional
constraints. For a succinct overview, see Brenda Heelan Powell, “Environmental Assessment & the Canadian Constitution”,
Environmental Law Centre (2014), online: http://elc.ab.ca/media/94543/EAConstitutionBriefFinal.pdf.
28
29
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and provides extensive enforcement and oversight powers, but without clear allocation of
responsibility to effectively implement follow-up and enforcement, and without adequate provisions
to ensure public access to data gathered.
In parallel with the passage of the IAA by the House of Commons, the federal government
committed, in the fall of 2018, to a strategic impact assessment process to consider how climate
change can be effectively integrated into the new federal assessment process. At the time of writing,
a discussion paper has been released for feedback, 33 but the actual assessment has not been formally
launched. The process is expected to answer some basic questions about the role of climate change
in deciding what projects should be assessed, what information needs to be gathered about the
GHG emissions of the proposed project and alternatives, and how to take the information gathered
about the project’s GHG emissions and feed that information into a project decision. Key elements
of the project decision from a climate perspective include how to determine whether the project will
contribute to or hinder Canada’s climate mitigation efforts, and how the project’s GHG emissions
feed into an overall determination about the project’s contribution to sustainability. The following
are key questions the strategic assessment will be challenged to address: 34
o Which projects ought to be assessed in light of direct and indirect GHG emissions
associated with proposed projects?
o What information should be gathered about the potential climate change impacts of a
proposed activity?
o What information should be gathered about the GHG emissions associated with alternatives
to the project and alternative means of carrying out the project?
o How should direct, indirect GHG emissions be considered in the assessment and decision
making phases of the IA?
o How could climate change impacts be quantified or measured in a way that can be used in
IA analyses, recommendations and determination of significance of environmental effects?
o How should local versus regional or global GHG emissions impacts of proposed projects be
factored into decision making, such as the project’s contribution to sustainability?
o What weight ought climate change impacts be given in final project decision-making (i.e.
approval or rejection)?
Many of these issues have been explored in a recent project funded by the Metcalf Foundation. 35
The resulting report deals in some detail with many of the challenges associated with integrating
climate change considerations into impact assessment processes, including how to define Canada’s
climate commitments, and how to translate those commitments into a standard against which
individual projects can be measured. Among the options explored are jurisdictional budgets,
sectoral budgets, efforts to decarbonize the Canadian economy by a set date, and the use of social
33 Government of Canada, Strategic Assessment on Climate Change - Discussion Paper (June 2018) online:
<https://www.strategicassessmentclimatechange.ca/discussion-paper>
34 See Gibson et al. “Paris to Projects Summary Report” supra note 5 (detailing key issues arising when determining how to
incorporate climate change considerations into IA).

35

Ibid.
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cost of carbon or other economic measures to assess the project’s impact on climate change and on
sustainability. 36 The rest of this paper explores potential role of social cost of carbon in impact
assessment in more detail.
PART II: INTRODUCING THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON
The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is a dollar figure representing the estimated cost of damages that
result from an additional ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted into the atmosphere. 37 Specifically,
this estimate is expressed in dollar amounts of the present discounted value of the future damage
that would be caused at a global level by releasing one metric ton into the atmosphere. 38 Put in more
colloquial terms, SCC “tries to add up all the quantifiable costs and benefits of emitting one
additional tonne of CO2, in monetary terms”. 39
The SCC concept emerged from recognition that climate change impacts have costs on society, and
the cost of such damages ought to be calculated in monetary terms. These damages include, but are
not limited to, sea level rise, severe weather, melting permafrost, ocean acidification, crop failure,
and ecosystems shifts. 40 In economic terms, assigning a monetary value to these emissions and their
costs is a step toward quantifying the market externality that is carbon pollution. 41
While methods for calculating SCC values continue to evolve, 42 practice to date has been a product
of pooling estimates generated by three integrated assessment models (IAMs): PAGE (Policy
Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect), FUND (Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and
Distribution) and DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy) models. 43 Each IAM employs a
different approach for estimating economic damage resulting from CO2 emissions. 44 SCC values are
derived by running the IAMs 10000 times using different inputs and scenarios for key modelling
inputs such as climate sensitivity, socio-economic and emissions trajectories, and discount rate. 45
Gibson et al, “Paris to Projects Summary Report” supra note 5.
ECCC “Technical Update” supra note 6 at 1.
38 NAS, Valuing Climate Damages supra note 7 at 1.
39 Simon Evans et al., “The Social Cost of Carbon” (February 2017) The Carbon Brief, online:
<https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-social-cost-carbon>.
40 Supra note 1.
41 High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices: Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017)
at 3, online:
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54ff9c5ce4b0a53decccfb4c/t/59b7f2409f8dce5316811916/1505227332748/Carbon
Pricing_FullReport.pdf>. See also, Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
42 See generally, NAS, Valuing Climate Damages supra note 7 (featuring a comprehensive account of practices and
recommendations for future updates to the SCC).
43 See ECCC “Technical Update” at 5, supra note 6 (for a succinct description of each model). See also Interagency Working
Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas, “ Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis
Under Executive Order 12866”, United States Government (August 2016) at 7-15, online:
<https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf> [US WG “Technical
Update 2016”]
44 ECCC “Technical Update” supra note 6 at 5. See also supra Steven Rose et al., “Understanding the Social Cost of Carbon: A
Model Diagnostic and Inter-Comparison Study” (2017) Climate Change Economics Vol. 8.
45 ECCC Technical Update (2016) supra note 6 at 5-6. For a detailed account, see US WG “Technical Update” supra note 43 at
15-16.
36
37
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SCC is widely acknowledged to be imperfect, 46 though there are varying degrees and threads of
critique. A full discussion of these limitations is beyond the scope of this article; however, it is
important to set out key concerns, as any use of SCC in IA ought only proceed with transparent
acknowledgement of these drawbacks. In general, most criticisms are centred on the assertion that
SCC is too uncertain to be used in government decision-making. 47 More specifically, these critiques
point to uncertainty in modelling parameters, lack of transparency in modelling practices, inadequate
representation of climate damages, inadequate representation of catastrophic events, uneven
capturing of inter-sector and inter-regional interactions, imperfect substitutability of environmental
amenities (i.e. assumption that natural system losses can be compensated with non-climate goods), ,
and expression of SCC as global value (as opposed to using just domestic values). 48
Generating SCC estimates require modelers to make critical choices that ultimately dictate the
quality and reliability of the outputs. 49 As Heyes et al. has explained, the IAMs used in SCC
modeling are “highly stylized and highly parameterized”, 50 meaning there is a significant amount of
uncertainty hidden behind SCC estimates. 51 This has resulted in a very large range of SCC estimates
coming out of the modeling. 52 There is one modelling input that has a particularly dramatic effect in
the SCC context: discount rate. Discount rate is a value given to money over time. 53 It represents
the trade-off between what a dollar is worth today and what a dollar would be worth in the future.
In the climate change context, this means “[m]ost of the climate-related benefits from current policy
efforts would take the form of avoided damages many years from now, whereas many of the costs
would be borne in the nearer term”. 54 Choosing a discount rate for assessments of climate change
policy has important implications because relatively small differences in the choice of this rate can
make a very large difference in the policy assessment. In short, SCC estimates decrease as discount
rates increase because a higher discount rate assumes increasing wealth in future generations and, as
a corollary, suggests that today’s less wealthy population should therefore not pay today. 55

ECCC “Technical Update” supra note 6 at 16.
Ruth Bell & Dianne Callan, More than Meets the Eye: The Social Cost of Carbon in U.S. Climate Policy in Plain English, World Resources
Institute Policy Brief (2011). See also John Pezzey, “Why the social cost of carbon will always be disputed” (2018) WIREs Climate
Change, online: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wcc.558>.
48 ECCC “Technical Update” supra note 6 at 16-20. See also Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, (2015) 39 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 371.
49 See Steven Rose et al., “Understanding the Social Cost of Carbon: A Model Diagnostic and Inter-Comparison Study”, (2017)
Climate Change Economics Vol. 8 (Comparing and assessing practices of the three IAMs used to generate SCC values).
50 Heyes et al., “The Use of a Social Cost of Carbon in Canadian Cost-Benefit Analysis” (2013) Can Pub Pol’y at 70.
51 Ibid. One might argue this is a more polite restatement of the well known George Box quote at the start of this article: “All
Models are wrong, but some are useful”. George Box and Norman Draper, Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces (New
York: Wiley, 1987).
52 See e.g. Ker Than, “Estimated Social Cost of Climate Change Not Accurate, Stanford Scientists Say”, Stanford News
(January 12, 2015), online: https://news.stanford.edu/2015/01/12/emissions-social-costs-011215/ [Tan]. See also, Frances
Moore & Delvane Diaz, Temperature Impacts on Economic Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy”, 5 Nature Climate
Change 125 (2015). Note that the different SCC values were generated by modelers assuming substantially slower economic
growth rates due to climate impacts.
53 NAS, Valuing Climate Damages supra note 7 at 15-19 (detailing the concept of discount rate and its calculation).
54 See Lawrence Goulder & Robert Williams, “The Choice of Discount Rate for Climate Change Policy Evaluation” (2012)
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 18301 at 1, online: <https://www.nber.org/papers/w18301.pdf>
55 Ibid at 4.
46
47
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Notwithstanding these critiques and disagreement on appropriate discount rates, it is now widely
acknowledged that assigning no value at all to future harms from climate change is inappropriate. 56
Canada (and, until recently, the United States) has taken this view and has been actively using SCC in
regulatory decision-making. 57
The United States has led the work to develop and update SCC values. 58 Federal agencies in the U.S.
began including estimates of the SCC following a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in the case of Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. 59 In that case, environmental groups challenged a final rule on fuel economy
standards. In the required cost-benefit analysis underpinning the rule, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration did not assign a monetary value to carbon emissions, instead stating that the
monetary value of benefits of reduced CO2 emissions could not be determined because of a wide
variation of estimates at that time. The Court ruled in favour of the petitioners, finding that, “while
the record shows that there is a range of values, the value of carbon emissions reduction is certainly
not zero”. 60 The court directed the NHTSA to update the regulatory impact analysis for the
regulation and to include a monetized value of carbon emissions when doing so. More recently, SCC
was at issue in the case of Zero Zone, Inc. v. United States Department of Energy in relation to energy
efficiency standards. 61 The Seventh Circuit found that agency had the authority to factor SCC into
its calculation of the rule’s benefits. 62
Beginning in 2009 shortly after the Center for Biological Diversity court decision, an Inter-agency
working group (U.S. WG) began developing and generating SCC estimates, and U.S. government
agencies began incorporating SCC into their cost-benefit analyses. 63 For example, the U.S. used SCC
values in federal regulations for light-duty vehicle emissions 64 and the performance standards for
GHG emissions from coal-fired power plants. 65 These analyses were part of Regulatory Impact

See Robert Pindyck and James Stock, “We don’t know what climate change will cost – that doesn’t mean we can ignore it”
(09 May 2018) The Hill, online: <http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/386952-we-dont-know-what-climatechange-will-cost-that-doesnt-mean-we-can>
57 See Wright, “Carbonated Fodder” supra note 11.
58 Ibid.
59 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9thCir. 2008).
60 Ibid at 1200.
61 Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 677–80 (7th Cir. 2016).
62 Ibid.
63 See NAS, Valuing Climate Damages supra note 7 (providing a detailed description of development and use of SCC in the
United States).
64 Regulatory Impact Analysis: Final Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (2012)
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100EZI1.PDF?Dockey=P100EZI1.PDF
65 Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified,
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (2015)
http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P100MWLE.TXT
56
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Analyses for proposed regulatory actions in the U.S. 66 The U.S. WG issued periodic updates to SCC
values, including technical updates in 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016. 67
More recently, the U.S. Working Group requested that the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering and Medicine, convene a committee of experts to research the modeling of economic
aspects of climate change to further inform future revision to SCC estimates. That committee
released its final report in January 2017. 68 This leadership and momentum from the U.S. has slowed
significantly, however. Despite progress by the U.S. and case law upholding agencies’ use of SCC, in
March 2017 a Presidential Executive Order disbanded the U.S. WG and declared the working
group’s technical guidance as no longer operative. 69 In short, the future of SCC in the U.S. is
uncertain, 70 though there continue to be pockets of application, 71 including in the EIA realm, which
is discussed further below.
In parallel, and perhaps in part in response to uncertainty from the White House, use of SCC in IA
has been litigated in U.S. courts. In High Country Conservation Advocates v. United States Forest Service, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado the court found an EIS inadequate owing to the
inclusion of quantified project benefits but omission of quantified costs. 72 The court specifically
identified SCC as an available tool. 73 In other cases, however, U.S. courts have been reluctant to rule

66 Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been part of regulatory development in the United States pursuant to a series of Executive
Orders. Requirements today flow chiefly from Executive Order 12866 (1993) and Executive Order 13563 (2011), which
requires U.S. government agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for all proposed regulations. CBA is part of the
“Regulatory Impact Analysis” (“RIA”) that the responsible agency generates for regulatory proposals. Exec. Order No. 12,866,
58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
67 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under
Executive Order 12866” United States Government (February 2010), online:
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/scc_tsd_2010.pdf; Interagency Working Group on Social
Cost of Carbon, “Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866”, United States
Government (May 2013); Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical Update of the Social Cost of
Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis” (November 2013); US WG ”Technical Update 2016” supra note 43.
68 NAS, Valuing Climate Damages supra note 7.
69 Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth (March 28, 2017) online:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-promoting-energy-independence-economicgrowth/
70 See e.g. Hannah Hess, “Despite Trump executive order, social cost of carbon still studied by federal agency”, (15 June 2017)
E & E news, online: <http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/06/despite-trump-executive-order-social-cost-carbon-stillstudied-federal-agency>.
71 See Iliana Paul et al, “The Social Cost of Carbon and State Policy” (October 2017) Institute for Policy Integrity, online:
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/SCC_State_Guidance.pdf. See also Environmental Protection Agency,
“Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse gas Emissions from Existing Electric
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review
Program” (August 2018) at 7-1 – 7-9, online: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201808/documents/utilities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf (Illustrating and example of the Trump Administration continuing to
use SCC, but extremely low “interim” estimates in the repeal and replacement of the Clean Power Plan; estimates were as low
as $1 per ton in the year 2030, compared to $60 from the US WG for the same year). See Harvard Law School Emmett
Environmental Law & Policy Clinic, “Comments on Flawed Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon in the Proposed Emission
Guidelines for the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units” (31 Oct 2018), online:
http://clinics.law.harvard.edu/environment/files/2018/11/ELPC-Comments-on-Proposed-ACE-Rule-Docket-No.-EPAHQ-OAR-2017-0355.pdf (For a reaction to methods and changes employed by the Trump Administration).
72 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1192–93 (D. Colo. 2014).
73 Id. at 1190
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that SCC must be required in NEPA reviews. 74 For example, in EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC the D.C.
circuit accepted the argument from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that SCC is too
imprecise and entails too much uncertainty to warrant inclusion in NEPA review. 75
In the Canadian context, the federal government has largely followed the U.S. lead on SCC. 76 In
2010, the federal government struck an interdepartmental working group (Canadian WG) to
consider options for valuation of GHG emissions in regulatory decision-making. 77 The Canadian
WG chose to use the U.S. SCC approach based on the rationale that it was well-suited to the
Government of Canada’s approach to cost-benefit analysis and the regulatory context. 78
Similar to the U.S., all federal departments and agencies in Canada are required to conduct a costbenefit analysis of proposed regulatory action. 79 Since the 2011 interdepartmental review, ECCC has
used SCC in all RIAS that involve GHG emissions. 80 For example, similar to the U.S., ECCC has
used SCC in RIAS for vehicle emissions and coal-fired power plants. 81 The most recent release of
the Canadian WG was a technical update in March 2016. 82 That update set the SCC estimate at
$40.7, 83 which was up from the 2011 estimate of $31.3. 84 The 2016 update indicated that the figure
would rise to $45.1 in 2020 and $49.8 in 2025. 85 These figures are the “central” SCC estimates, 86 as
opposed to the “95th percentile” estimates, which use a different discount rate to generate a high
SCC value to represent low-probability, high-cost impacts of climate change. 87 Some experts have
suggested that SCC figures ought to be significantly higher than those used by the U.S. WG and
Canadian W.G. 88
Notwithstanding progress in the development and deployment of SCC figures, Canada has not
extended use of SCC beyond the regulatory decision-making cost-benefit sphere – in IA context or
otherwise - and the experience in the U.S. has been limited with uneven rulings from the courts. To
74 See supra note 8 at 618-622. See also Congressional Reports Service, “Courts Evaluate How Federal Agencies Put a Price on
Carbon” (Nov 2016), online: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/carbon.pdf>
75 828 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
76 Wright “Carbonated Fodder”, supra note 11.
77 ECCC “Technical Update 2016” supra note 6 at 1.
78 ECCC “Technical Update 2016” supra note 6 at i.
79 Government of Canada, “Cabinet Directive on Regulatory Management” (2012), at (G), online:
https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/federal-regulatory-management/guidelines-tools/cabinetdirective-regulatory-management.html#cha67. See also Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Canadian cost-benefit analysis
guide: regulatory proposals” (2007), online: <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2013/sct-tbs/BT58-5-2007eng.pdf> (Setting out detailed guidance for cost-benefit analysis).
80 ECCC Technical Update 2016, supra note 6 at 2.
81 Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, (2012) “Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-fired Generation of
Electricity Regulations” C Gaz II, at 7.4, online: <http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2012/2012-09-12/html/sor-dors167eng.html>. Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, (2012) Heavy-duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emission
Regulations, C Gaz II, at 7.2.3, online: <http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2012/2012-04-14/html/reg1-eng.html> .
82 ECCC “Technical Update 2016” supra note 6.
83 ECCC “Technical Update 2016” supra note 6 at 27.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid at ii, 13 (explaining that the central value uses a 3% discount rate, which is the rate recommended by Treasury Board
Secretariat guidance and is also the rate recommended by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget).
87 Ibid at 9.
88 See Frances Moore & Delvane Diaz, Temperature Impacts on Economic Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy, 5 Nature Climate
Change 125 (2015).
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date, no litigation in Canada has focused on the SCC, nor has SCC been employed in an IA
processes.
The climate change mitigation and carbon pricing context in Canada today is ripe for consideration
of wider deployment of SCC in the sphere of impact assessment. As discussed in Part II, the
overhaul of Canada’s federal impact assessment regime presents an important juncture in this regard.
While some commentary has emerged on this topic in the U.S. context in relation to SCC and
NEPA, 89 there has been none in Canada to date beyond the preliminary discussion in the
abovementioned Metcalf Foundation report. This paper begins that discussion.

PART III – SOCIAL COST OF CARBON IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

This Part considers the potential of SCC to contribute to the integration of climate considerations
into IA. To do so, SCC is first considered in relation to the purposes of IA, and then discussed in
relation to the assessment and decision-making phases of IA, with particular attention to the
consideration of economic conditions, cumulative effects analysis, sustainability assessment, and
international climate change commitments. To make this analysis as meaningful as possible, a
hypothetical LNG project is presented initially and then referenced throughout the balance of the
article.

SCC and the Purposes of IA
The basic purpose of IA, as stated above in Part I, is to inform decisions on whether and under
what conditions to approve proposed activities. IA seeks to predict the impact of such activities
before they are permitted to proceed. As described in the seminal Supreme Court of Canada case of
Oldman River Society v. Canada, “[e]nvironmental impact assessment is, in its simplest form, a planning
tool… As a planning tool it has both an information gathering and decision-making component
which provide the decision-maker with an objective basis for granting or denying approval of a
proposed development”. 90
Integrating climate change considerations into IA serves these broader objectives of gathering
information to make informed decisions and plans for the future. The key challenge, however, is
how to make information with respect to climate change contextualized and meaningful enough
such that it can be used by the public and decision-makers in a practical way. As incorporation of
climate change considerations into IA evolves and use of SCC expands, a key question is what roles
could SCC play in IA? Once such options are understood, decisions can be made with respect to
89 See e.g supra note 8. See also, Nathanial Shoaff and Marni Salmon, “Incorporating the Social Cost of Carbon into National
Environmental Policy Act Reviews for Federal Coal Leasing Decisions” (April 2005) Sierra Club whitepaper, online: <
https://content.sierraclub.org/environmentallaw/sites/content.sierraclub.org.environmentallaw/files/SCC%20White%20Pape
r%20FINAL.pdf>
90 Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada, [1992] 1 SCR 3.
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what roles ought SCC play. The focus here is on the former, leaving specific recommendations for
policy-makers to determine based on various options.
Canada’s proposed new IAA offers a useful example of an IA regime through which deployment of
SCC in IA can be explored. With respect to IA objectives, the IAA enumerates a number of specific
purposes, several of which are relevant to climate change and potential uses of SCC in IA. Relevant
examples of IAA purposes are: fostering sustainability; protecting the environment and health,
social, and economic conditions; taking into account positive and adverse effects of a proposed
project; considering projects in a careful and precautionary manner; providing opportunities for
public participation; and encouraging assessment of cumulative effects. 91 The new IAA also includes
a mandate provision requiring the government to exercise its powers under the Act “in a manner
that fosters sustainability… and applies the precautionary principle”. 92
The overarching objectives of IA and the specific purposes under the new IAA reveal a broad basis
for use of SCC in IA. As has been noted in the U.S. context with respect to SCC and NEPA, there
is a strong conceptual fit between IA and SCC. 93 As a tool that is inherently about generating
information about the costs of climate change impacts on society, SCC may assist in the planning
and decision-making that IA is designed to inform. Put conversely, IAs that do not integrate a
monetary value of climate change damages that would result from a proposed project’s emissions
can lead to decisions based on incomplete information, particularly insofar as decisions are made
based on economic costs and benefits of the proposed project. 94 Indeed, this is the very rationale
that has underpinned use of SCC in regulatory decision-making in Canada and the United States,
where SCC has had a prominent role in informing cost-benefit analyses. 95 This rationale has also
been put forward in litigation in the U.S. in relation to SCC in IA under NEPA. 96 Practical
application is emerging as well, with the World Bank incorporating a monetary value of carbon
emissions in its economic analysis of project financing in recent years, 97 and more than 1200 firms
now use an internal carbon price, or “shadow price”, to evaluate investments and guide decisionmaking. 98

Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.6(1)
Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.6(2)
93 Supra note 89.
94 See Senator Edward Markey et al, Letter commenting on Comments on Docket No. PL18-1-100 (July 26, 2018), online:
<https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-06-25-FERC%20Comments--Pipeline-CertificationSCC4_signed.pdf> (strongly asserting the point that assessments of projects should have a comprehensive and defensible
estimate of the total costs of expected greenhouse gas emissions).
95 David. Wright, Carbonated Fodder: The Social Cost of Carbon in Canadian and U.S. Regulatory Decision-Making, 29 Geo.
Envtl. L. Rev. 513 (2017).
96 Congressional Research Service Reports, “Courts Evaluate How Federal Agencies Put a Price on Carbon” CRS Legal
Sidebar, (November 1, 2016), online: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/carbon.pdf>.
97 World Bank, “Shadow price of carbon in economic analysis - Guidance note” (12 November 2017), online:
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/911381516303509498/2017-Shadow-Price-of-Carbon-Guidance-Note-FINALCLEARED.pdf>.
98 Manjyot Bhan Ahluwalie, “The Business of Pricing Carbon: How Companies are Pricing Carbon to Mitigate Risks and
Prepare for a Low-Carbon Future”, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions Brief (Sept 2017), online:
<https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/09/business-pricing-carbon.pdf>
91
92
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To explore specific ways SCC could be used, the below sections consider the potential role and
value of SCC in the assessment and decision-making phases of IA. The proposed Impact Assessment
Act, of course, includes both of these phases, and it is in these two parts of the IA process where
climate change considerations would be explicitly required under the new Act. As such, the specific
requirements of the IAA are used below as a basis for considering what roles SCC could play.
However, most of the concepts discussed here would also be relevant in national and sub-national
IA regimes around the world.

SCC in the Assessment Phase
Substantive assessment of the potential impacts of a project is driven by the factors that must be
taken into account during the course of the IA process (often referred to as “scope of
assessment”). 99 The new IAA expands the factors in Canada’s federal assessment regime in a way
that includes those that existed under the previous statute, 100 such as cumulative effects, 101 and adds
new requirements such as “the extent to which the designated project contributes to
sustainability”, 102 and “the extent to which the effects of the designated project hinder or contribute
to the Government of Canada’s ability to meet its environmental obligations and its commitments in
respect of climate change”. 103 The IAA also includes, for the first time, an explicit requirement to
assess a project’s positive and negative impacts on “economic conditions”. 104 In total, the IAA
includes 16 factors for consideration in the assessment. While there are a number of factors that are
relevant to carbon emissions, such as mitigation measures 105 and alternatives to the project, 106 the
present discussion focuses on the four most relevant to using SCC: economic conditions, cumulative
effects, climate commitments, and sustainability. Each of these are discussed in sequence below.
However, a hypothetical example is first presented to illustrate how SCC values could be generated.
This portion of any IA SCC analysis would be substantively similar; adjustments necessary for use in
association with specific IA factors are discussed in relation to each further below.
Calculating SCC in relation to a specific project
Given that SCC is a monetary figure calculated on the basis of each additional tonne of carbon
emitted, any use of SCC must begin with identifying the projected tonnes emissions associated with
the activity being assessed. This initial question of calculating the megatonnes (MTs) associated with
the activity raises fundamental questions about how to incorporate climate change considerations –
99 Though, of course, the “scope of project” is the most significant driver of what will be assessed. This is very true in the
context of climate change considerations, where scoping a project narrowly could remove significant emission sources and
amounts out of the assessment entirely. In the Canadian context, “scope of project” is done through the Regulations Designating
Physical Activities, which list physical activities that are “designated projects” under the Act. These regulations will be modified
under the new IAA regime.
100 CEAA 2012, s.19.
101 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1)(a)(ii).
102 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1)(h)
103 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1)(l)
104 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1(a)
105 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1)(b)
106 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1)(f)
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and GHG emissions specifically – into IA. Detailed discussion of these dimensions appears in detail
in the abovementioned Metcalfe report and will not be fully restated here. 107 However, several points
are important to note in relation to SCC, particularly with respect to calculating gross versus net
carbon emissions. To illustrate these points, we present a hypothetical project, a liquefied natural gas
(LNG) project. Other suitable examples include a mine, a hydro project, a pipeline, an oil sands
project, among many other projects listed as requiring a federal IA.
With respect to the hypothetical LNG project, the critical threshold matter would be to determine
which expected emissions should be attributed to the proposed project: direct, indirect (i.e. upstream
and/or downstream), both, or some type of tailored approach. Only once this determination is made
can an analysis using SCC begin. In terms of direct emissions, these calculations would include the
emissions resulting from the construction, operational, decommissioning and reclamation phases of
the processing facility, the marine terminal and likely nearby related infrastructure such as roads and
power lines. This analysis would be relatively straightforward, calculating emissions that would result
from these activities in each project phase using an appropriate methodology for GHG projections
and accounting.
Indirect emissions are more complicated. For present purposes, these will be treated as “upstream”
and “downstream” emissions. Regarding upstream, scoping determinations would have to be made
with respect to which production activities are included. For example, it would have to be decided
what emissions associated with the transmission pipeline will be considered (e.g. emissions
associated with construction, operation, decommissioning and abandonment of that gas pipeline).
Similarly, it would have to be decided what emissions associated with production and development
of the resource will be scoped in (e.g. extraction, gathering, refining as well as any other emissions
from construction, operations, decommissioning and reclamation). These are very consequential
project scoping decisions as they will form the basis of total project emissions numbers used to
generate total project costs using SCC.
Regarding downstream emissions, two lines of inquiry would be required: estimating gross emissions
and estimating net emissions. Estimating gross emissions would be relatively straightforward. This
would require using an appropriate methodology 108 for calculating the GHGs emitted from the
ultimate consumption of the LNG produced by the Canadian project. While there would be
important modelling inputs to clarify, on its face this would seem quite feasible. The second line of
enquiry to determine downstream emissions would be more complex: calculating net emissions. This
analysis would be focused on emissions reductions or increases in other jurisdictions that result from
consumption of the LNG (e.g. avoided burning of coal and avoided construction of new coal-fired
electricity generation plants, or replacing wind, solar or energy conservation). Any emission
reductions achieved elsewhere as a result of the project could be applied to the project’s total GHG
figures, resulting in a lower net emissions number. 109 In the present context, how to go about this is
Gibson et al., “Paris to Projects Summary Report” supra note 5.
See e.g. World Resources Institute, “The GHG Protocol for Project Accounting” & World Resources Institute (2004),
online: <https://ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/standards/ghg_project_accounting.pdf>
109 This is, of course, premised on the reality that GHG emissions co-mingle in the atmosphere so the geographic location of
emissions reductions does not matter.
107
108
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an open question. There is a need to decide to what extent projected changes of foreign emissions
would be considered in the downstream analysis and how to calculate this. For an LNG project in
particular, it is often asserted that LNG projects in Canada result in displacing use of coal in Asia as
a benefit associated with such projects. 110 Generating an empirical basis for this emissions
displacement assertion, an assertion that is presently disputed, 111 and then incorporating those
quantitative findings into the calculation of a project’s net GHG emissions is a tremendously
important step. Only once such a calculation is completed can the asserted avoided-emissions
benefit be reliably included in the impact assessment.
Adding to this complexity are two important nuances in the downstream GHG emissions scoping
and calculation context. First, the net impact of exporting Canadian LNG is likely to change over
time. While LNG may replace coal in today’s context, later in the life of this same project it is
foreseeable that, depending on the destination country, the LNG could actually displace other
energy sources such as wind or solar or geothermal. 112 Such changes over time must be incorporated
in these downstream calculations to the extent possible (such appropriate methodologies would have
to be identified or developed). Second, future energy scenarios in another jurisdiction are difficult to
predict, and may depend on whether one is assuming a Paris-compliant or non-compliant world. For
example, this LNG project may displace more coal-fired electricity generation if the context is a
world of 3 or 4 degrees of warming where the destination country has no intention of integrating
cleaner technologies. This variability and unpredictability cannot be completely eliminated; however,
the GHG tabulation could use of different scenarios to provide a suite of net emissions
projections. 113
Only once such calculations of direct and indirect emissions are completed can SCC be engaged in
assessment of specific IA factors. With the GHG scoping decisions and calculations described
above complete, the application of SCC would be a relatively straightforward exercise. The total
emissions amounts determined would be multiplied by the selected SCC estimate(s). For example, if
the LNG project would result in annual additional emissions amounts of 1MT of direct emissions, 6
110 Jessica Jaganathan and Julie Gordon, “LNG Canada, nation’s biggest private-sector project yet, wins go-ahead”, Financial
Post (02 October 2018), online: <https://business.financialpost.com/commodities/energy/update-3-massive-canada-lngproject-gets-green-light-as-asia-demand-for-fuel-booms>. See also B.C. Speech from the Throne, 2016 Legislative Session: 5th
Session, 40th Parliament,
https://www.leg.bc.ca/parliamentary-business/legislation-debates-proceedings/40th-parliament/5th-session/throne-speech
111 Matt Horne, “Comments on the CEAA Pacific NorthWest LNG draft environmental assessment report”, Pembina
Institute (11 March 2019) at 10-11 online: https://www.pembina.org/reports/pnwlng-ceaa-2016.pdf (noting that LNG from
BC may displace coal but it also may compete with energy efficiency and renewable energy, resulting in the delay of integrating
those technologies). See also Matt Horne and Josha MacNab “Liquefied Natural Gas and Climate Change: The Global
Context.” Victoria, BC: Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions (October 2014), https://www.pembina.org/pub/lng-andclimate-change-the-global-context.
112 Ibid. See also James Coleman and Sarah Marie Jordan, “Clearing the Air: How Canadian LNG Exports Could
Help Meet World Greenhouse Gas Reduction Goals” C.D. Howe Institute E-Brief (24 August 2016), online:
https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/e-brief_244.pdf. See also James Coleman
et al, “Calibrating Liquefied Natural Gas Export Life Cycle Analysis: Accounting for Legal Boundaries & Post-Export
Markets.” Occasional Paper 49. Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law (2015).
https://prism.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/id/44157/LNG-OP49.pdf/;jsessionid=3417EFA334F57085419904EC16B9D064
113 This could be in the likeness of the scenarios presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or the
International Energy Agency.
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MTs of upstream emissions, and avoided downstream emissions of 3MTs, then each of those
volumes would be multiplied by the SCC estimates to generate a quantitative estimate of total gross
and net social costs attributable to the specific project’s direct, upstream and downstream emissions.
Applying the federal government’s most recent SCC “central estimate” in relation to this LNG
project, 114 the calculation of the annual cost of the direct emissions using today’s figures would look
like this: 1MT x $40.7/t = $40.7 million (cost). The calculation would be similar for upstream
emissions: 6MTs x $40.7/t = $250.2 million (cost). Downstream emissions would also be similar =
3MTs x $40.7/t = $122.1 million (avoided costs; i.e. benefit). For this particular project, we can see a
single year net benefit of $81.4 million if only direct and downstream emissions are incorporated,
but a net cost of $168.8 million if direct, upstream and downstream are all incorporated.
There would, of course, be multiple ways to present this information in various sets of aggregated
and disaggregated data. 115 At the very least, it is reasonable to expect the analysis to use the two SCC
values that Canada currently uses in its cost-benefit analysis as part of assessing regulatory impact:
$40.7 (“central” value) and $167 (“95th percentile” value). 116 The IA calculation of MTs might go a
step further and use four SCC values based on the four different values (and three different discount
rates) previously used in regulatory impact analyses in the United States. 117 These different values
could also be applied separately to the project’s direct, upstream and downstream emissions. And, as
discussed above, the latter may include several scenarios, meaning the SCC analysis would apply
multiple SCC values to several different downstream emissions projects in another jurisdiction.
While calculations of this nature would generate a relatively large volume of complicated
information, Canada and the U.S. have been doing similar in regulatory impact analyses for several
years. 118 Further, generating volumes of such information in a transparent way is generally in line
with the purposes of impact assessment, as discussed above. Ultimately, under Canada’s new IAA
regime, it would be up to the final decision-makers (i.e. federal Cabinet) to decide how much weight
to accord these various costs projections in the final public interest determination.
With this general picture of employing SCC in relation to project emissions now set out, we turn to
specific factors of consideration in IA and associated final decision-making.

ECCC “Technical Update 2016” supra note 6.
For an example of how this could be done in relation to an oil sands project, see Branko Bošković and Andrew Leach, ,
“Leave It in the Ground? Incorporating the Social Cost of Carbon into Oil Sands Development” (December 24, 2017)
University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2920341, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920341 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920341>
116 ECCC “Technical Update 2016” supra note 6 (both figures employ a discount rate of 3%; the latter is used by the Canadian
Working Group to estimate the sensitivity of the results to higher SCC values)
117 US WG Technical Update supra note 43.
118 See e.g. Regulatory Impact Analysis: Final Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (2012)
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100EZI1.PDF?Dockey=P100EZI1.PDF. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units (2015) http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P100MWLE.TXT
coal-fired regs impact analysis.
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Economic Conditions
Under the new IAA, assessment of a project’s impacts on economic conditions is explicitly required.
An impact assessment must take into account “the changes to the environment or to health, social
or economic conditions and the positive and negative consequences of these changes that are likely
to be caused” by the project. 119 This explicit reference to “economic conditions” and associated
“positive and negative consequences” is new in Canadian IA. Unlike other jurisdictions, 120 federal
assessment in Canada has traditionally not explicitly employed an economic cost-benefit analysis.
Rather, costs and benefits have been presented in a more narrative way as part of recommendations
on whether a projects is in the public interest. 121
Notwithstanding the unusual wording of this new provision, it provides a basis for analysis that
employs monetary figures to look at costs and benefits (i.e. “positive and negative consequences”) of
a project’s impacts. SCC has a logical fit here: given the impact assessment is now concerned with
economic impacts on society at large, then SCC could contribute to producing a more accurate
economic picture. It could, for example, be used to compare expected positive consequences
expressed in quantitative figures, such as jobs, royalties and other benefits, with negative
consequences expected from carbon emissions impacts. A look at the Joint Review Panel Report for
the Northern Gateway project illustrates this point. That report included a sub-section on
“economic burdens and benefits”, an “analysis of project costs and benefits, 122 and figures setting
out expected economic benefits such as $312 billion increase in Canadian gross domestic product,
$44 billion in federal government revenues, $54 billion to provincial or territorial governments, $70
billion in Canadian labour income. 123 Costs of carbon emissions were not included in the report,
though it did present projected spill clean-up costs. 124 In a future assessment of such a project, these
specific economic benefit figures could be better contextualized and better understood by the public
and decision-makers if presented along side quantitative information carbon GHG emission impacts
generated by using SCC.
For SCC to be used in this context, however, the above-described scope of MTs would have to be
tailored to match the scope of the benefits to which the costs are compares. For example, if the
calculation of project benefits does not include jobs or royalties associated with upstream
development activities, then upstream MTs ought not be factored into the SCC calculations for
purposes of the economic analysis. Additionally, government guidance (and perhaps review panel
terms of reference) would have to set out the methodological parameters such as clarifying which
Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1)(a)
See e.g. Council on Environmental Quality, “Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews” (2016) at 3233, online: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/nepa_final_ghg_guidance.pdf>
(acknowledging that U.S. government agencies conducting NEPA reviews may engage in monetary cost benefit analysis).
121 See e.g. National Energy Board, “Report of the Joint Review Panel for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, Volume 2”
(2013) at 9-13, online: <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/one-neb/NE23-176-2013-2-eng.pdf>.
122 Ibid at 9-13, 286.
123 National Energy Board, “Report of the Joint Review Panel for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, Volume 1” (2013)
at 31, online: <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/one-neb/NE23-176-2013-1-eng.pdf>.
124 Ibid at 67.
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SCC values (e.g. “central”, “95th percentile”, and others) to use in relation to project-related
emissions. Again, it would be up to decision-makers to decide how much weight to accord these
different representations of costs against the economic benefit figures.
One concern that may arise in using social cost of carbon in assessing positive and negative
consequences of a project on economic conditions is that social cost of carbon, as is it currently
concocted, is a global figure – it represents damages at a global level. To the extent that the
assessment of economic conditions is focused on international dimensions (e.g. downstream
benefits outside Canada), clearly a global cost of carbon would be appropriate. To the extent that the
assessment is limited to the domestic context, some may suggest a global SCC value in
inappropriate. However, given Canada’s commitment under the Paris Agreement to contribute its
“fair share” to addressing climate change, it is reasonable to proceed on the basis that any project
emissions that are approved will increase Canada’s obligation to assist with decarbonization,
adaptation and loss and damage efforts outside Canada, so the social cost outside Canada will still be
a cost to Canada. As such, despite project economic benefits typically be local and domestic in
nature, it is tenable to assess these domestic benefits against the cost of climate change impacts that
are felt both domestically and internationally. While some narrow circumstances may warrant use of
a country-specific social cost of carbon to augment the analysis, such an approach has not yet been
developed and would have to be examined through further research.
As a final comment in relation to economic considerations as an IA factor, it is important to note
that this factor contemplates changes to the environment and changes to health, social and
economic conditions. These dimensions are all included in the modeling that generates SCC values.
As such, while, SCC figures may be useful in assessing changes to “economic conditions” by
presenting monetary figures, the SCC figures also have relevance by representing a monetary value
of changes (i.e. costs) to the environment and health and social conditions. On its face, this suggests
a strong fit between SCC and this specific IA factor (notwithstanding inherent limitations in SCC, as
discussed in Part II). Of course, it is critical to point out that such economic analysis would be just
one part of the IA, which would ultimately be weighed against important non-monetized (and nonmonetizable) impacts, such as impacts of a project on the rights of Indigenous peoples. 125

Project Cumulative effects
Cumulative effects are changes to the environment caused by an action in combination with other
past, present and future actions. 126 Climate change is inherently about cumulative effects: the
atmospheric changes driving climate change are a product of past and present emissions building up
cumulatively over time. 127 Traditionally, however, cumulative effects analysis (CEA) has been used to
Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1)(c) and s. 63(e).
See Meinhard Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process: A Guide and Critique, LexisNexis (2008) at 27-28. See also
Neil Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 141
[Craik].
127 IPCC AR5, supra note 1.
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understand impacts in the geographic region of the proposed project. 128 For example, a typical CEA
might examine cumulative impacts related to habitat fragmentation, water withdrawals, regional air
pollution, nutrient loading, or land use changes. 129 At its core, CEA is a tool used to understand the
true significance of a project’s effects given what is taking place in the surrounding region and
ecosystems. 130 Climate considerations have typically not been part of this analysis.
While Canadian courts have held that cumulative effects must be assessed in accordance with
legislative requirements, 131 the practice of CEA has been an ongoing challenge, 132 and IA has fallen
short of its potential to use cumulative effects analysis (CEA) as a venue for considering a project’s
contribution to the wider impacts of climate change. Greenhouse gas emissions have been
considered in some IAs, 133 perhaps owing in part to guidance issued in 2003; 134 however, given that
such analysis was not an explicit requirement until the proposed IAA, consideration of GHG
emissions and their impacts has been discretionary and uneven. 135
Cumulative effects may be an appropriate venue for deployment of SCC. However the analysis
would be distinctly different from traditional CEA. First, unlike traditional CEA, analysis of
cumulative GHG emissions and associated costs would presumably not identify specific valued
ecosystem components (VECs) in the vicinity of the proposed project. Rather, the VEC would
essentially be the global climate system, and impacts on this VEC impacts would already be built
into SCC as part of the globally-based modelling of impacts. Similarly, and again unlike traditional
CEA, this analysis would not identify spatial boundaries in the geographic region of the project
because the impacted geographic region is the entire globe (owing to the fact that carbon emissions
co-mingle globally and SCC is expressed as a cost to society at a global level).
Relatedly, use of SCC in CEA would presumably deviate from conventional CEA geographic
scoping (i.e. looking at projects and activities in the same geographic vicinity that have had an impact
on environmental conditions). Instead, pre-determined carbon budgets or decarbonisation pathways
would be substituted in the place of typical geographic parameters. These budgets or pathways
would set the geographic or jurisdictional context in relation to which the project’s emissions would
Noble, Intro to EA supra note 2.
Ibid.
130 Noble, Intro to EA supra note 2 at 242.
131 Alberta Wilderness v Cardinal River Coals Ltd., [1999] 3 FC 425; see also Bow Valley Naturalists Society v Canada [2001] 2 F.C. 461
(FCA).
132 See Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “Implementation of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012” Report
of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (2014) at 4.62-4.72, online: < http://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_cesd_201410_04_e_39851.html>. See also Rod Northey, Guide to the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis, 2018) at 259-268 (stating that litigation has demonstrated persistent tension
around what must be included in that assessment of cumulative effects).
133 See e.g. Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC - Trans Mountain Expansion Project:
Review of Related Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates” (19 May 2016), online: <https://www.ceaaacee.gc.ca/050/documents/p80061/114550E.pdf>
134 Federal-Provincial-Territorial Committee on Climate Change and Environmental Assessment, “Incorporating Climate
Change Considerations in Environmental Assessment: General Guidance for Practitioners” (November 2003), online:
<https://www.ceaa.gc.ca/Content/A/4/1/A41F45C5-1A79-44FA-9091D251EEE18322/Incorporating_Climate_Change_Considerations_in_Environmental_Assessment.pdf>
135 See Mark Friedman , "Assessing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Oil Sands: Legislative or Administrative (in)Action?",
(2016) 6:3 online: UWO J Leg Stud 5.
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be assessed. Such budgets could be provincial, regional, national or sectoral in nature, or a mix. In
effect, use of these budgets or decarbonisation pathways would substitute for the typical analysis
conducted under CEA guidance calling for examination of physical activities that have been carried
out and that will be carried out (i.e. activities that are “certain” and “reasonably foreseeable”). 136
Framing this as a question, the CEA would ask how the costs from a project’s emissions relate to
the past, present and future emissions within this particular jurisdiction’s or sector’s carbon budget.
The ensuing analysis would be based on whichever MTs are determined to be a result of the
proposed project and whichever past and future activities are scoped into the CEA analysis.
That project’s emissions figures (however delineated based on project scoping, as explained above)
would then be used for the CEA. CEA scoping would require setting of temporal boundaries, i.e.
which years of past and future emissions will be scoped into the CEA, as well as setting of carbon
budget parameters – i.e. regional, provincial, national, or sectoral. For example, the CEA might be
set such that the project’s direct emissions will be assessed against cumulative national GHG
emissions commencing in 1990, with further assessment in relation to the 2030 Paris Agreement
target and Canada’s current Canada’s Mid Century Long-Term Low-Greenhouse Gas Development
Strategy. To further contextualize the project’s emissions, the CEA might also assess the project
against any to-be-developed tailored sectoral emissions cap. 137 As such, built into this this analysis
would be the temporal scoping (e.g. 1990 to key emission reduction target dates) and geographic
scoping (e.g. national emissions), and possibly sectoral scoping (e.g. LNG, or oil and gas).
As discussed in relation to final decision-making below, this SCC portion of the CEA would
ultimately be considered by federal Cabinet as part of the branch of the public interest determination
under s.63 that requires consideration of “the extent to which adverse effects within federal
jurisdiction and the adverse direct or incidental effects that are indicated in the impact
assessment”. 138 What weight such information is accorded would ultimately be up to federal Cabinet.
To perhaps state the obvious, the SCC figures generated through this CEA analysis would be
focused on the effects of the project as expressed in dollar figures. It is theoretically possible, of
course, that the project has a net benefit by virtue of avoided emissions downstream. If the SCC
analysis does indeed show net negative effects (i.e. adverse effects), then Federal Cabinet would
essentially have to make a values-based judgement as to whether the total figure (or range of figures)
exceeds any kind threshold that is unacceptable. Such thresholds could be set out in guidance or
regulations to provide more certainty to proponents and the public. Ultimately, such decisions
would also have to incorporate non-monetary findings of the IA such as the tremendously
important matter of impacts on the rights of Indigenous peoples.
Project helping or hindering or contributing to meeting climate change commitments

136 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Assessing Cumulative Environmental Effects under the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012” (March 2015) at 3, online: <https://www.ceaaacee.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=1DA9E048-1&pedisable=true>
137 See e.g. Oil Sands Emissions Limit Act, Statutes of Alberta, 2016, Chapter O-7.5 (as an example of a hard emissions cap being
imposed on a specific sector).
138 Bill C-69, supra note 3 s.63(b)
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The most obvious basis for using SCC in IA is under an explicit legislated requirement to consider
climate change dimensions. While the practice of incorporating climate change considerations in IA
is uneven internationally, Canada’s new IAA contains such a provision as one of the factors to be
taken into account in an assessment:
[T]he extent to which the effects of the designated project hinder or contribute to the
Government of Canada’s ability to meet its environmental obligations and its commitments in
respect of climate change 139
To date, inclusion of this provision has generated many questions, 140 which are expected to be
answered, at least in part, in regulations and guidance yet to come. The terms “environmental
obligations” and “commitments in respect of climate change” are not defined in the Act. In
forthcoming regulations and guidance, it is likely that this provision will become the basis for a
“climate test” or suite of climate tests that would be used to gather information about a project’s
expected emissions and assess the impact of such emissions in relation to Canada’s climate change
commitments and environmental obligations.
The utility of SCC in this part of an impact assessment would be driven by the specific aims of the
climate-related assessment. For example, if the objective is to gather information and make a
decision based on the project’s contribution to climate change impacts and damages – what could be
termed a ‘damages-based assessment’ – then SCC would be a strong conceptual fit. Put another way,
SCC would be a useful tool if the focus is on assessing whether a project is in the public interest
after taking into account the monetary cost of climate change impacts it would cause (including in
relation to impacts- or damages-related commitments in the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, as set
out below). However, if the assessment is aimed exclusively at gathering information and making a
decision based on how a project would impact Canada’s ability to meet an emissions reduction target
– what could be called a ‘target-based assessment’ – then SCC may have less of a role to play. In
practice, it is foreseeable, if not advisable, that there will be multiple climate tests employed under
the IAA, particularly given the broad framing of the climate-specific assessment factor under s.22
and public interest factor under s.63. 141 SCC-based analysis could inform one of these tests.
For the present analysis, it is assumed that the commitments and obligations referenced in the IAA
will be linked to commitments under the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. Under any reasonable reading, “commitments in respect of climate
change” would include the fundamental commitment in the UNFCCC to “stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” , 142 This goal in the UNFCCC has, of course,
now been quantified in the Paris Agreement with the goal of keeping global average temperature
increases “well below” 2 degrees and the explicit ambitious acknowledgement of limiting the
increase to 1.5 degrees. For Canada’s part, quantitative emission reduction commitments take the
Bill C-69, supra note 3, s. 22(1)(l). It is also a basis for final decisions on whether a project is in the public interest – s. 63(d).
See Gibson et al “Paris to Projects Summary Report” supra note 5.
141 See Ibid (for a description of climate tests that may be developed and employed under the IAA).
142 Article 2, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 849 [UNFCCC].
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form of Canada’s NDC under the Paris Agreement, 143 along with a commitment to increase the
ambition of its NDC to make a fair contribution to the global temperature goal. 144
Relating these commitments to SCC in IA, one would expect that given the core commitment of
avoiding dangerous climate change and the associated quantitative targets and commitments, Canada
must understand costs from climate change-induced harm it would be authorizing by approving a
proposed project. Further, and framed in a more pragmatic manner, target-based commitments are
just a means to the ends of avoiding dangerous climate change, and SCC may therefore relate more
directly to the primary UNFCCC objective.
Canada’s “commitments in respect of climate change” would also include commitments beyond
those dealing with emission reduction targets and climate change mitigation. Examples include the
following:
•

•

•

•

•

UNFCCC Article 4 (1)(f) – Taking into account climate change considerations in relevant
social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ appropriate methods,
for example impact assessments, formulated and determined nationally, with a view to
minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the
environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate
change; 145
UNFCCC Article 4 (1)(h) - Promoting and cooperating in the full, open and prompt
exchange of relevant scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal
information related to the climate system and climate change, and to the economic and
social consequences of various response strategies; 146
Paris Agreement Article 2 (1)(a) - Holding the increase in the global average temperature to
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce
the risks and impacts of climate change;
Paris Agreement Article 7(9)(c) - Each Party shall, as appropriate, engage in adaptation
planning processes and the implementation of actions, including the development or
enhancement of relevant plans, policies and/or contributions, which may include:
(c) The assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability, with a view to formulating
nationally determined prioritized actions, taking into account vulnerable people, places and
ecosystems;
Paris Agreement Article 8(1) - Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and
addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including

Government of Canada, “Canada’s 2017 Nationally Determined Contribution to the United Nations Framework
Conveniton on Climate Change, (2017), online:
<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Canada%20First/Canada%20First%20NDCRevised%20submission%202017-05-11.pdf>
144 Article 4(3), Paris Agreement, CP DEC 1/CP.21, 21st Sess (2016) FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1.
145 UNFCCC Article 4 (1)(f)
146 UNFCCC Article 4 (1)(h)
143
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•

•

extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in
reducing the risk of loss and damage.
Paris Agreement Article 9(3) - As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should
continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources,
instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of
actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs
and priorities of developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should
represent a progression beyond previous efforts.
Paris Agreement Article 12 - Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to
enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and
public access to information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to
enhancing actions under this Agreement.

These provisions provide an ample basis for the use of SCC under the IAA, particularly if read in
conjunction with the provisions of the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and the IAA that emphasize
precaution and transparency. These specific commitments are primarily impacts-oriented (as
opposed to targets-oriented), which provides a basis – if not an imperative – for use of a damagesbased assessment tool such as the SCC. Through relating government decisions and ensuing carbon
emissions to the damage they cause, Parties can more comprehensively and diligently gauge whether
they are fulfilling such commitments.
Outside the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement realm, one recent commitment is particularly salient. In
September 2018, Canada endorsed a joint statement on North American Climate Leadership, which
included explicit reference to social cost of carbon and a commitment to “promote opportunities to
use the Social Cost of Carbon appropriately across a wide range of policy applications”. 147 It should
be noted, however, that neither Canada’s Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris
Agreement, 148 nor the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, 149 nor
Canada’s Mid Century Long-Term Low-Greenhouse Gas Development Strategy 150 discuss the social
cost of carbon or the role of impact assessment in achieving stated commitments.
Recalling the LNG hypothetical project set out above, the actual quantitative analysis here would be
driven by key project emissions scoping decisions, determination of direct and indirect project
carbon emissions (including net and gross), and then use of SCC values to present a range of
expected climate-related damages based on different SCC values. This SCC data would then be
considered by federal Cabinet as part of the climate change commitments branch of the public
interest determination under s.63. Presumably, this SCC dimension of the IA’s analysis of climate
change considerations would complement other target-based analyses such that the final IA report
Government of Canada, “Joint statement on North American Climate Leadership” (14 September 2018), online:
<https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2018/09/joint-statement-on-north-american-climateleadership1.html>
148 Supra note 143.
149 Online: <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/documents/weather1/20170125-en.pdf>
150 Government of Canada, “Canada’s Mid Century Long-Term Low-Greenhouse Gas Development Strategy” (2016),
online: <https://unfccc.int/files/focus/long-term_strategies/application/pdf/canadas_mid-century_long-term_strategy.pdf>
147
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details how a project contributes to or hinders Canada fulfilling its target-based and impact-based
commitments. As such, a target-based analysis would inform decision-makers as to the amount of
GHGs expected from the project, and the SCC damages-based analysis would inform decisionmakers as to the impact of those emissions, together generating a full picture.
It should be noted here that concerns regarding SCC being a global figure would be less of an
obstacle under this part of the IAA. The new climate change provisions in the IAA are inherently
about the global context and Canada’s commitments in that realm. Further, this climate change IA
factor explicitly refers to “effects”, which is defined very broadly in the IAA to include “changes to
the environment or to health, social or economic conditions and the positive and negative
consequences of these changes”. 151 There is no domestic contextual constraint imposed by this
provision. 152

Project Contribution to Sustainability
While there is a long-standing strong link between IA and sustainability, 153 the concept has
heightened prominence in the new IAA regime. Sustainability is defined in the IAA to mean “the
ability to protect the environment, contribute to the social and economic well-being of the people of
Canada and preserve their health in a manner that benefits present and future generation”. 154
Fostering sustainability is a core purpose of the Act 155 and sustainability features prominently as a
factor to be considered in the assessment 156 as well as final decision-making. 157 As a factor to be
considered, section 22 requires that the impact assessment of a proposed project takes into account
“the extent to which the designated project contributes to sustainability”. 158 This could serve as a
basis for use of SCC in IA.
Much still needs to be fleshed out within the new IAA regime in terms of what the sustainability
factor will require in the assessment and how it will be used. Presumably this will be included in tobe-developed regulations or guidance. As such, it is difficult at this stage to go beyond the basic
acknowledgement that there is a strong conceptual fit between an assessing a project’s contribution
to sustainability and the SCC. However, at least two options are conceivable at this time. One option
would be a stand-alone SCC analysis that would then be added to other analysis or analyses that are
conducted to fulfill the s.22 requirement and inform consideration under s.63. Under this option,
the stand-alone analysis would be very similar, if not identical, to the process outlined above in
Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.2
Though it should be noted that IAA s.22(2) provides a discretionary basis to limit the scope of this and other impact
assessment factors.
153 See Craik, supra note 216 at 77. See also Robert Gibson, Meinhard Doelle & John Sinclair, “Fulfilling the Promise: Basic
Components of Next Generation Environmental Assessment” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 257 (for a detailed look at
“sustainability assessment” and “next generation environmental assessment”)
154 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.2
155 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.6(1)(a).
156 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1)(h)
157 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.63(a)
158 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.22(1)(h)
151
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relation to economic conditions effects. That is, the project’s total GHG emission costs, expressed
in ranges based on net and gross GHG figures using a range of SCC values, would simply be placed
into whatever broader set of sustainability analyses are conducted. In cases where a project may
appear viable based in part on contributing positively to sustainability by virtue of net positive social
and economic impacts, the SCC may offer an added lens through which all associated costs can be
assessed, providing a more complete picture of a project’s viability in monetary terms.
A second option would be to integrate SCC as one input in a broader sustainability assessment
matrix conducted under s.22. Given the language of s.22(1)(h), this matrix would presumably include
a suit of inputs compiled and calibrated to assess the explicitly described aspects of sustainability:
“ability to protect the environment”, “contribution to the social and economic well-being of the
people of Canada”, and preservation of Canadian’s health, all in a manner that benefits present and
future generations. Given the explicit reference to economic benefits of the project, SCC may be
particularly well placed as a monetary-based tool to ensure comprehensive and balanced coverage of
a project’s expected economic benefits and costs (recognizing that the project may make a positive
or negative contribution to social and economic well-being). Again, this would be substantively
similar to the economic analysis described above with respect to the “economic conditions” impact
factor. It is important to note, however, that this assessment of a project’s contribution to
sustainability would presumably include the calculation of the economic dimensions of a project’s
costs and benefits (including SCC) as well as effects that cannot be put into monetary terms (the
latter would need to be identified, and this would have to be approached carefully such that such
impacts are not already included in SCC modeling inputs). Canada may look to U.S. agencies’ use of
cost-benefit analysis in NEPA reviews as a model for conducting an assessment with monetized and
non-monetized dimensions of a proposed project. 159
A key challenge for use of SCC within an assessment of a project’s contribution to sustainability
under the Canadian IAA, however, is the global nature of SCC values. The IAA is explicit in
confining sustainability to the domestic context. By referencing “social and economic well-being of
the people of Canada” and “their health” the definition makes very clear that the emphasis is on
sustainability with respect to Canada and Canadians. This could be addressed at in at least two ways.
First, as suggested above and as explored in the Metcalfe report, one could reasonably conclude that
any project emissions that are approved will increase Canada’s obligation to assist with
decarbonization, adaptation and loss and damage efforts outside Canada, so the social cost outside
Canada will still be a cost to Canada. Alternatively, instead of using the SCC global values generated
by the Canadian WG, Canada could generate a domestic-specific SCC. Developing such country
country-level SCC values is, however, only at a very early stage, 160 and its potential use would be
quite limited. Recent changes by the Trump Administration in this direction 161 has attracted sharp
Supra note 120.
See Katharine Ricke et al., “Country-level social cost of carbon”, Nature Climate Change Vol. 8, p. 895–900 (2018).
161 See Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse
gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units (August 2018) at 4-2 – 4-4, online:
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/utilities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf (featuring most
prominent example of the Trump Administration - the repeal and replacement of the Clean Power Plan, where “interim” SCC
estimates were as low as $1 per ton in the year 2030, compared to $60 from the US WG for the same year).
159
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criticism in part because of the risk that it will be used inappropriately to suggest the cost of GHG
emissions is much lower than it actually is. 162
Similar to assessment of other factors discussed above and the hypothetical example initially
presented, the quantitative SCC analysis within the sustainability assessment would be an exercise of
developing a methodology for calculating SCC data in relation to a proposed project (i.e. SCC values
multiplied by project-related gross and net carbon emissions and then presented as range of
expected climate-related damages based on differ emission scoping and SCC values). This output
SCC data would then be considered by federal Cabinet as part of the sustainability branch of the
public interest determination under s.63, as discussed below.

SCC in the Decision-Making Phase
In many IA regimes, including Canada’s, once the assessment is complete, the process proceeds to a
decision-making phase. Such decision-making is based on the final assessment report containing
information gathered through the assessment phase, including information gathered under each of
the factors referenced above such as cumulative effects, mitigation measures, public input and more
(though scoping of factors is discretionary in most cases). Under current federal environmental
assessment legislation, CEAA, 2012, and its predecessor, CEAA, the ultimate decision on a project
turned on whether the project was “likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects”, 163 and,
if so, whether those effects are justified in the circumstances. 164
The IAA will change this approach. Under the new regime, the final decision will be based on
whether the project is in the “public interest”. 165 This public interest determination must be based
on the IA report, 166 which the Minister or Cabinet, as the case may be, 167 uses when considering the
five factors explicitly set out in the Act. To summarize, these factors include: the project’s
contribution to sustainability, extent of adverse effects (subject to some jurisdictional parameters),
mitigation measures, impact on the rights of Indigenous peoples, and the extent to which the effects
of the designated project hinder or contribute to the Government of Canada’s ability to meet its
environmental obligations and its commitments in respect of climate change. 168
It is at this decision-making stage of an IA that information gathered through the assessment phase
and included in the final report would be put before decision-makers (i.e. federal Cabinet) for
162 See e.g. Harvard Law School Emmett Environmental Law & Policy Clinic, “Comments on Flawed Estimates of the Social
Cost of Carbon in the Proposed Emission Guidelines for the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility
Generating Units” (31 Oct 2018), online: http://clinics.law.harvard.edu/environment/files/2018/11/ELPC-Comments-onProposed-ACE-Rule-Docket-No.-EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355.pdf
163 CEAA 2012, s.52(1).
164 CEAA 2012, s.52(2).
165 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.60(1), if it is the Minister making the decision. IAA s.62, if it is the Governor in Council making the
determination.
166 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.63: (“Minister’s determination … must be based on the report with respect to the impact
assessment and a consideration of the following factors…” [emphasis added]).
167 Bill C-69, supra note 3 s.60(1) and s.62 (the former refers to Minister, while the latter refers to Cabinet).
168 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.63.
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consideration in service of the final determination as to whether (and under what conditions) the
project is in the public interest. If SCC were used in the assessment phase to calculate damage that
would be caused by a project’s carbon emissions, for example, it is at this stage that decision-makers
would be required to take SCC-generated damages figures into account and weigh it along with
other public interest factors. The key question with respect to the potential role of SCC becomes:
how would SCC values and project-related calculations be used to inform the weighing of public
interest factors and, ultimately, the final public interest determination? While work continues toward
fleshing out regulations and guidance for implementation of Canada’s new IA regime, including with
respect to final decision-making, it is possible at this early stage to consider how SCC-generated
information could factor into final decisions.
The IAA is structured with relatively clear links between several of the s.22 assessment factors and
the public interest determination factors. In terms of SCC in IA, the three most relevant public
interest factors are the project’s contribution to sustainability, extent of adverse effects, and the
extent to which the effects of the designated project hinder or contribute to the Government of
Canada’s ability to meet its environmental obligations and its commitments in respect of climate
change. Deliberation and determination on these factors would be informed by relevant parts of the
requisite EIS, which would include analysis discussed above in relation to the s.22 factors to be
considered. Analysis of GHG and SCC in relation to climate change commitments would inform
consideration under s.63(e); such deliberations in relation to sustainability would inform
consideration under s.63(a); and SCC analysis in relation to cumulative effects would inform
consideration under s.63(b) (as part of considering “adverse effects”). Analysis of changes to
“economic conditions” could reasonably be included under either s.63(b) or (e) It should be noted
that while the Act does not provide explicit direction on how decision-makers will make trade-offs
in formulating a final public interest determination, the Act does require detailed reasons that
demonstration consideration of all s.63 factors. 169
With respect to the climate change public interest factor, the basis for consideration in final
decision-making is as follows:
“the extent to which the effects of the designated project hinder or contribute to the
Government of Canada’s ability to meet its environmental obligations and its commitments
in respect of climate change”. 170
Under this branch of the public interest considerations, the Minister or Cabinet, as the case may be,
would have to consider the SCC-based damages figures included in the IA report as part of the
“hinder or contribute” assessment. 171 In this context, SCC may be of significant complementary
value to other climate tests that have been more frequently contemplated by organizations and
commentators. 172 Where other climate tests would likely address how a project may affect Canada’s
Bill C-69, supra note 3 s.65(2).
Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.63(e).
171 Under IAA s.60-62 the Minister or Cabinet, as the case may be, must to take into account the content of the IA report,
which, would include the SCC analysis based on the s.22 factors discussed above.
172 See Gibson et al. “Paris to Projects Summary Report”, supra note 5.
169
170
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ability to meet emission reduction targets, SCC would complement such data by detailing the cost of
the damages attributable to the project’s emissions. For example, while a project may be shown to
emit a quantitatively specific volume of per year, resulting in what decision-makers might view as a
relatively insignificant hindering of Canada’s ability to meet its climate commitments, SCC would
allow decision-makers to see that the same MTs from the project would result in significant costs in
climate damages. This would allow decision-makers to consider how the project affects Canada’s
ability to meet climate change commitments and environmental obligations that relate to impacts
rather than targets (recalling that targets are just a means to avoiding the worst impacts). Of course,
this analysis would be different if the project net and gross carbon emission calculations show a net
reduction of emissions, such that the project ‘help’ Canada meet its climate commitments. To date,
there is limited understanding of how to use SCC to assess benefits, as it is inherently focused on costs
of carbon emissions.
Additionally, if one takes the view that SCC represents an estimate of liability that may eventually
attach to Canada for its contribution to global GHG emissions causing climate change, then this
SCC figure in IA decision-making would facilitate a better understanding of financial risks associated
with approving the project. Relatedly, given Canada’s commitments to climate finance, projectrelated SCC values could serve as a starting point to determine what emissions charge project
proponents ought to pay for the privilege of emitting GHGs in a carbon constrained world. Such
payments could be imposed through project approval conditions and then drawn on as a source of
funds for Canada to use to fulfill climate finance and loss and damage commitments. Similarly,
approval conditions could be used as a mechanism to allocate risk of emissions overages with
proponents such that they are required to pay any costs associated with emissions that are above
those projected during the project review stage. Of course, this dimension of the assessment and
decision-making would need to ensure that there is no double-counting of (let alone double-paying
for) emissions under any applicable federal or provincial, or, if considering downstream emissions,
foreign, carbon pricing regime.
Within this climate change stream of public interest considerations, the decision-makers would have
to make difficult decisions about how much weight to attribute to target-based and damages-based
GHG emissions information in final decision-making. For example, it would be open to the
government to state clearly whether there are any absolute or proportional SCC figures that are
determinative – i.e. a threshold beyond which costs from climate change impacts attributed to the
project make it not viable. Whether the federal government will develop a decision-making matrix to
guide deliberations about trade-offs is unknown at the present time; though, as stated above, there is
the legislated requirement in the IAA for detailed reasons to accompany any final determination.
With respect to sustainability, the “contribution to sustainability” public interest factor requires that
the Minister or Cabinet’s public interest determination consider “the extent to which the designated
project contributes to sustainability”. 173 The IAA definition of sustainability would apply in the
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operation of this provision, confining the concept to Canada and Canadians, 174 as discussed above.
However, given that it is under this branch of the public interest factors that economic costs and
benefits of the project would likely be weighed, it would be reasonable to include SCC damages
figures here in the interest of incorporating the fullest amount of monetized costs and benefits in the
analysis, notwithstanding the global nature of the SCC values. This is because despite the SCC values
being global, any future responsibility or liability associated with paying those costs would
foreseeably be attributed in some form to Canada. In this way, it relates directly to Canada and
Canadians and is therefore within the intent of this s.63 public interest factor. The key assumptions
here are that Canada intends to fulfill its Paris commitment to make a fair contribution to the global
effort to address climate change, or that Canada will at some point be held liable for some degree of
present and future emissions. 175
Recalling the two preliminary options for use of SCC in a sustainability analysis in the assessment
phase discussed above (stand-alone SCC analysis or SCC analysis integrated into a broader
sustainability matrix and determination), both methods could make SCC a valuable tool in in the
economic analysis of whether a project is economically viable and therefore in the public interest.
The stand-alone assessment, substantively similar to the SCC calculations for assessing changes to
“economic conditions”, would generate a set of figures expressing a project’s expected costs in the
form of climate damages. Decision-makers would then need to decide how much weight to accord
the SCC figures in relation to other costs and benefits of the project (including non-monetary
dimensions), and to then explain this in the detailed reasons required under s.65(2). Under a method
that uses SCC within a broader sustainability assessment, presumably the same SCC calculations
would be conducted, but the weighting and interrelation between costs and benefits would be built
into the assessment matrix. In either approach, the SCC would contribute to a more robust
consideration of the sustainability public interest factor by providing important information about
project costs in a monetized fashion.
Regarding adverse effects in final decision-making, s.63 requires consideration of “the extent to
which the adverse effects within federal jurisdiction and the adverse direct or incidental effects that
are indicated in the impact assessment report in respect of the designated project are adverse”. 176 It
is under this factor that use of SCC in analysis of cumulative effects would be before the Minister or
Cabinet. Consideration of the SCC portion of the CEA under this branch of the public interest
determination would involve looking at the impact of a project’s emissions in relation to the predetermined carbon budget or other frame of reference described above (i.e. scoped according to
time-frame, jurisdiction, sector, etc, but not according commitments under the Paris Agreement). This
would be separate and different from the question of the extent to which a project hinders or
contributes to Canada’s ability to meet its commitments in respect of climate change. In this way,
174 Bill C-69, supra note 3 at s.2 (Sustainability means the ability to protect the environment, contribute to the social and
economic well-being of the people of Canada and preserve their health in a manner that benefits present and future
generations).
175 See generally Richard Tol & Roda Verheyen, “State Responsibility and Compensation for Climate Change Damages—A
Legal and Economic Assessment” (2004) 32 Energy Pol’y 1109.
176 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s. 63(b)
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decision-makers would have an additional piece of information that brings in dimensions that are
not part of the analysis of whether a project helps or hinders Canada’s efforts to meet its
commitments. For example, the downstream emissions implications of using LNG in China are not
relevant to the help or hinder analysis, but they could come in here.
How much weight SCC figures are given in relation to these other environmental effects under this
branch of the public interest determination, let alone in relation to the other public interest factors,
would have to be determined as part of forthcoming IAA implementation details. Again, any
application of SCC in this part of the public interest determination would require at least some
coverage in the detailed reasons required under s.65(2).
In the interest of full coverage of the IAA public interest factors in final decision-making, it should
be noted that the s.63 requirement to consider mitigation measures would also be relevant (as would
assessment thereof based on the assessment factor in s.22). 177 This factor requires consideration of
“the implementation of the mitigation measures that the Minister or the Governor in Council, as the
case may be, considers appropriate”. 178 Consideration of information generated by SCC analysis
under this factor would be relatively straightforward. Final decision-makers would simply be
considering what mitigation measures (including those imposed through project approval
conditions) have been or could be imposed to reduce the carbon emissions and therefore reduce the
damage caused by the project’s contribution to climate change. Similarly, a key consideration would
be whether a project’s emissions would be covered by a federal or provincial carbon pricing regime
such that climate-related costs of the project are already accounted for – and collected – through
another regulatory mechanism. Additionally, this analysis could factor in any measures Canada is
taking to fund adaptation and mitigation activities outside Canada. Such consideration would likely
be part of a broader analysis of climate change dimensions within the IA. Of the five public interest
determination factors, mitigation measures is the most likely candidate to be coupled with another
factor for full consideration of climate-related dimensions of an IA, including SCC.
Finally, it should be noted that the public interest factor pertaining to the impact of a project on the
rights of Indigenous peoples is not discussed in detail here. This is, however, an extremely important
part of the IA regime, and an important part of the federal government’s stated commitment to
reconciliation and the implementation of UNDRIP, as discussed in more detail by several
commentators with respect to the new regime. 179 Regarding climate change impacts, IA and
Indigenous peoples specifically, there is a clear need for research of this topic, especially from a
damages-based analysis perspective. As is well documented, Indigenous peoples, particularly those in
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Ibid.
179 See David Laidlaw, “Bill C-69, the Impact Assessment Act, and Indigenous Process Considerations” (15 March 2018),
ABlawg (blog), online: https://ablawg.ca/2018/03/15/bill-c-69-the-impact-assessment-act-and-indigenous-processconsiderations/. See also Sara Mainville, “The Ghost of the Harper Omnibus Legislation Continues on with Bill C-69” (12
February 2018) OKT (blog), online: <https://www.oktlaw.com/ghost-harper-omnibus-legislation-continues-bill-c-69/>. See
also David V Wright, “Indigenous Engagement and Consideration in the Newly Proposed Impact Assessment Act: The Fog
Persists”, (27 February 2018), ABlawg (blog), online: <https://ablawg.ca/2018/02/27/indigenous-engagement-andconsideration-in-the-newly-proposed-impact-assessment-act-the-fog-persists/>.
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the far north, are disproportionately affected by climate change. 180 SCC may have a role to play in
calculating monetary dimensions of the manner in which climate change impacts Indigenous
individuals and communities; however, such analysis ought to be separate and apart from a rightsbased analysis of impacts to the rights of Indigenous peoples. Further, any role for monetized
figures would need to be approached with respect and sensitivity given the impossibility of
quantifying such rights and impacts in monetary terms. Put more broadly, it is hard to see a tenable
(nor respectful) basis for use of monetary cost-benefit analysis in consideration of the factor listed in
s.63(d).

Strategic Assessment
It is important to note that SCC’s potential role in the assessment and decision-making phases may
also be shaped by the outcome of a strategic assessment (SA) conducted by the federal government
under s. 95 of the IAA 181 or otherwise. The government has begun early steps in this regard,
notwithstanding the IAA not yet providing a legislated basis. 182 In summer 2018, the government
issued a discussion paper, Developing a Strategic Assessment of Climate Change, 183 that began the process
and solicited views from stakeholders. The stated intention of the SA of climate change is to
“provide guidance to proponents, stakeholders, Indigenous peoples and decision-makers on how
climate change should be considered in federal impact assessments”. 184 If this SA proceeds, 185 it is
foreseeable that it will consider and recommend potential roles of SCC in EIA (and beyond, e.g.
with respect to carbon pricing regimes), particularly given the discussion paper questions focused on
how impacts from a project’s GHG emissions ought to be assessed. 186 Such analysis of impacts is
squarely within the realm of what SCC could contribute in an IA, as per the foregoing discussion in
this article. Strategic Assessment outcomes may then shape use of SCC under the IAA by
prescribing how the SCC ought to be used in a project-specific IA under the IAA. Pursuant to
s.22(p) of the IAA, such a conclusion of the SA must be taken into account if the SA is conducted
under s.95 of the Act.
As a final comment, it should be noted that the discussion in this article has been largely based on
IAA assessment factors and consideration of such analysis in final decision-making. Another way to
approach analysis of what roles SCC might play would be for government to begin constructing the
180 See Susan Hassol, Arctic Climate Assessment (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). See also IPCC 1.5° SPM,
supra note 1 at 11, 13.
181 Bill C-69, supra note 3, s.95.
182 There is, however, the Federal Cabinet Directive. See Government of Canada, “Strategic Environmental Assessment: The
Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals (2010), online:
<https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ceaa-acee/documents/strategic-environmental-assessment/cabinet-directiveenvironmental-assessment-policy-plan-programproposals/cabinet_directive_on_environmental_assessment_of_policy_plan_and_program_proposals.pdf>
183 Supra note 33.
184 Ibid at p.3.
185 At the time of writing, this process has stalled. The looming federal election has created uncertainty as to whether the full
SA will proceed in the near future.
186 Supra note 33 at 6.
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IAA analytical and final decision-making frameworks (i.e. through regulations, guidance, analytical
frameworks), then identify gaps where the SCC could be used to ensure better decisions. For
example, it could be that once a decision-matrix is generated for the sustainability determination, it
becomes apparent that more information is necessary in the form monetary quantification of
societal costs. Similarly, it could be that as government develops a decision framework to assess the
extent to which a project’s emissions hinder or contribute to achievement of climate commitments it
recognizes a need to assess impacts beyond emissions reduction targets, such as loss and damage or
climate finance. Regardless of one’s starting point for exploring potential roles of SCC, however,
much of the analysis and discussion in this article remains informative.

CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion suggests, there are a number of ways SCC could be deployed in IA. An
important conclusion at this conceptual stage, particularly in the Canadian context, is that there is a
strong potential fit between high level purposes of IA and the type of information SCC offers, as
well as a strong fit between the technical level requirements of a robust IA and the detailed data SCC
can be used to generate. Overall, if one acknowledges the importance of going beyond a simple
inventory of a project’s carbon emissions and recognizes the importance of contextualizing those
MTs beyond reference to emission reduction targets, then it is clear that SCC could make significant
contributions to assessments and associated decisions.
How this ought to be done will depend in large part on how the rest of the assessment and decisionmaking regime is structured and calibrated, particularly with respect to integrating projected carbon
emissions and their impacts. In the current Canadian context, the promised SA on climate change,
and answers to questions regarding how to assess climate-related impacts of a project will shape this
discussion in important ways. As the law and policy development proceeds, now is an important
time for scrutinizing and improving SCC methodologies such that the tool is worthy of public
confidence and can fulfill its purpose of representing costs of carbon emissions accurately and
meaningfully. Any role SCC may play in EIA will only be as useful as the quality of SCC
methodologies themselves. Poor SCC practices and or indefensible SCC values would, of course, be
at odds with the purposes and requirements of any robust impact assessment regime.
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